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INTRODUCTION 
STATE OF ART NDE IN QUANTITATIVE INSPECTION 
E. L. Caustin 
B-1 Division, Rockwell International 
Los Angeles, California 
Before I get started into the main point of the discussion, the "State 
of the Art NDE in Quantitative Inspection,'' I would like to define what NOT, 
NDI, and NDE mean to me. 
"NOT," nondestructive testing, is basically the use of various and 
sundry means for the detection of defects within structures or components with 
out doing damage. 
"NDI," nondestructive inspection, is the use of selected NOT techniques 
to inspect assembled aircraft in the field. 
Several years ago we began to read in the ASNT magazine about "NDE," 
nondestructive evaluation. I had the feeling that a group of people were 
trying for more professionalism and looking for a better sounding name. I 
would like to define nondestructive evaluation in a way to make it more meaning-
ful and a cha 11 enge to you; and that is "NDE" is the use of equipment that 
detects and quantifies defects within a part or structure and provides the 
acceptability evaluation. 
In the B-1 (which is shown in Fig. 1) contract, we have a requirement 
for fracture mechanics which requires a new look at the ability of nondestructive 
testing and nondestructive evaluation. The Statement of Work states: "Without 
special NOT you must design the structure to withstand a .150-inch defect~ in 
its most critical dimension and orientation, for the life of the air vehicle." 
In the case of a surface flaw, that means .150-inch deep. The engineers were 
very concerned with this requirement since it would make them have an 
airplane with a tremendous weight, and it would never be able to get off the 
ground. However, the Work Statement continues: "If you have some special 
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NOT, you may presume initial defects smaller than the .150, but you must 
demonstrate that you can find them with 90 percent detection and 95 percent 
confidence. 11 That stated reliability is the same as that for the handbook 
properties data on materials used by design engineers. Of course, the 
engineers asked the usual question-- 11 What can you find?'' We can find all 
kinds of defects, but it depends on the kind of material, the structural 
shape, and such things as location of the defect. 
We determined that our capability ranged from ten thousandsths (.010 11 ) 
to fifty thousandths (.050 11 ), depending on the type of inspection technique, 
penetrant, mag particle, radiography, ultrasonics, or eddy current. We 
estimated our capacity could demonstrate the .050 11 defect detection. 
Engineering immediately elected to design the B-1 to .050 11 and defined the 
critical cracks as shown in Fig, 2 for surface defects, and Fig. 3 for sub-
surface defects. A depth of 3 inches was about the maximum we could reliably 
interrogate titanium. 
With the defect criteria established, two things happened: (1) the 
B-1 design was started, and (2) Quality Assurance started demonstrating 
their detection capability. This simultaneous effort made the need for success 
very apparent. Fortunately, we passed. Had we failed, it would have meant 
redesigning much of the B-1 airplane. 
There were some ground rules that were established to satisfy the 
demonstration program. (1) The specimens were to be furnished by the govern-
ment, the B-1 Systems Project Office. (2) The defects were to be fabrication-
type defects. In other words, the flaw should represent those that occur by 
fabrication techniques and not by fatigue or other field environments. (3) The 
fabrication methods had to be described to us so we could agree that the 
samples represented fabrication-type defects. (4) Rockwell was to receive a 
few standards to use to establish the inspection procedures. (5) Any go or 
no-go intermediate decisions during the demonstration had to be approved by 
the Air Force. (6) The procedures that were to be used on the B-1, had 
to be used. (7) Must use the inspection personnel that were certified to do 
the job and that were actually going to do it on the B-1. (8) The Air Force 
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personnel on-site (AFPRO) were to continually monitor the program. (9) The 
data analysis was to be done on the basis of destructive testing and as a 
cooperative effort between the Air Force and ourselves. The test plan (Fig. 4) 
was established by Dr. Packman, a member of the Air Force team. He set up 
the four flaw-size groups that ranged in depth from .010 to .120. 
There are some techniques that do very well at either end of the size 
spectrum. That is, they can detect the small defects but may miss the larger 
ones, and vice versa. For example, some penetrants are very good on small 
defects, but when the crack is larger, they are easily washed out, thus miss-
ing the larger cracks. We had to pass the complete family of crack sizes from 
.150 to a minimum size of .050. The sampling plan was set up on a statistical 
basis, and a given lot of specimens contained both flawed and unflawed speci-
mens. The plan,with no misses for a given technique, would require 244 
observations. If one miss occurred in any one size group, another 30 samples 
would be added with another 60 control specimens. When adding all the possible 
observations for the techniques we used, and all the materials involved, there 
could be a total of 6,172 individual observations to demonstrate for the B-1 
program. Of course, the effort would be smaller if no misses occurred (2,200). 
We decided that the B-1 fracture critical parts could be inspected 
with penetrant, magnetic particle, ultrasonics, and eddy current. We dropped 
X-ray as we didn't feel the required reliability detection of .050 11 defects 
for the material thickness involved was obtainable, and we didn't need it as 
a final inspection technique. 
These pictures (Figs. 5 and 6) are of the various types of samples that 
were used. You can see bent titanium sheet (small cracks in the bends), 
titanium blocks (that were diffusion-bonded with internal defects at various 
depths), drilled specimens (with corner cracks), a series of specimens of 
titanium, aluminum, steel specimens (with surface cracks), and welded steel 
and welded titanium specimens in a variety of thicknesses (with cracks). The 
machining specifications that we use on the floor were employed on the speci-
mens. This provided a machined surface, the same as we would experience with 
the B-1 parts during manufacture. The welded specimens were protected to 
allow access from only the far side of the defect. The Air Force were the 
128 
--' 
N 
1..0 
TEST PLAN 
(90-95) 
FLAW SIZE RANGE 
I 
GROUP TARGET SURFACE CRACK DEPTH -
NUMBER LENGTH ( 2C) - INCH INCH 
1 0. 030 - 0: 075 0. 010 - 0. 035 
2 0. 076 - 0. 100 0. 020 - 0. 050 
3 0. 101 - 0. 150 0. 020 - 0. 070 
4 0. 151 - 0. 2 50 0. 020 - 0. 120 
TOTAL FLAWED 
CONTROL 
CUMULATIVE INSPECTIONS 
•2 MISSES ALLOWED 
TSP72-3890 
Fig. 4 
A 
8 
8 
8 
8 
32 
30 
-
62 
I-T-
INSPECTION SEQUENCE 
B c I D• 
8 15 I 30 
8 15 I 30 8 15 30 
8 15 I 30 
32 60 I 120 
30 '60 I 60 
- -
124 244 I 424 
__, 
w 
0 
TSP71 -10831 
NOT TEST SPECIMENS 
4 
Fig. 5 
131 
Vl 
s:::: 
Q) 
E 
"" .,.... u 
oQ) 
O'l 0. 
.,.... V> 
LJ.... 
+-> 
Vl 
Q) 
I-
were the only ones who knew which of the samples contained the flaws, and 
in which size group they would be. The specimens were numbered and control-
. led by the Air Force. 
To simulate the bolt holes in the wings of the airplane, we have 
samples of stacked up material of aluminum, titanium, and steel in various 
configurations, and here we were looking for cracks within the drilled holes 
(Fig. 7). Somewhere within the stack is a flaw. There are many more 
unflawed than flawed holes in this case. 
The demonstration consisted of these four methods: Penetrant, magnetic 
particle, ultrasonics and eddy current. The various materials--steel, 
aluminum, titanium, welded as well as diffusion-bonded--were employed. I would 
like to point out again that we had to use the inspection personnel that were 
certified to do the job and that were actually going to do it on the B-1. The 
NOT engineer or technician from the laboratory could not be used. Further, the 
shop inspectors were not told that they were being tested in any way. At 
that period of time, on the B-1, there were a lot of similar specimens going 
through the shop, such as tensile bars and coupons with which the engineering 
materials laboratory was evaluating materials; therefore, we made up regular 
manufacturing orders that were just like those of similar parts going through 
the shop. The tickets were dummied up to show operations performed and 
accepted by inspection, down to the NOT "Inspect" line, which was left open. 
This line told the inspector what criteria and what procedure to use. 
I am happy to report that all the various techniques we used with 
the combination materials were all passed,and the limits ranged from .030" 
to .050", as shown in Fig. 8. This demonstrated detection capability proves 
that the detection capability of NOT today is very adequate. We had predicted 
that it would probably take about 4,000 observations to do the job, expecting 
some misses. Actually, it only took approximately 2,500 observations to 
demonstrate the 90-95 percent capability. This kind of success tells us not 
only that our capability of detection is adequate, but that it is much better 
than what we demonstrated. 
Let•s take a look at some results. In Fig. 9, it can be seen that a 
few specimens were at the . 05o•• end of the spectrum. Had more samples been 
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selected of the smaller size, we would have easily demonstrated 90-95 per-
cent at a level of .020 11 • The only misses occurred at ten-to-eleven 
thousandths. As it turned out, one particular inspector, out of about six 
involved, missed four observations in the same size range. A review revealed 
a very interesting fact about certification of people. Once certified, some 
become 11 inventors 11 by altering the processes so they are comfortable in doing 
the work. That 1 s what happened here. The inspector found a simpler way, he 
thought a better way, of doing the job, but it made him ineffective in 
detecting the smaller defects. Discipline to the NDT procedures is very 
important for success. 
Now that we can detect a defect and know in what size range it is, 
there is still the question remaining as to whether or not the part is good, 
and can it be used? 
Today, our nondestructive evaluation and quantitative values are 
obtained using a standard which is run with the part, Fig. 10. NDE then is 
really one of comparison to some known standard. This .is a time-consuming 
approach because once you find a defect, one must manually go back over the 
defect and characterize it. For example, what kind of losses are involved? 
What kind of wave shape is produced on the scope? etc? This method relies 
considerably on the technicican 1 s experience. It is considered slow and not 
too cost-effective. Those standards are very costly. For the B-1, it takes 
quite a few standards to do the job. Someone mentioned earlier today that 
they are going to have a shelf on which to put their standards. I say your 
shelf isn 1 t going to be big enough. Figure 11 shows a few of the standards we 
are using on the B-1. 
In the B-1 Program we have tried to minimize separate standards. For 
example, in diffusion-bonding, the standards are built into the part itself. 
Within a portion of a diffusion-bonded part, there is a section that is 
removed for process control purposes, so we bond known defects into these 
bond lines, This provided standards with the same material and processing 
history as the part, It is an excellent inspection aid. The nondestructive 
evaluation technique employing the 11 inspection aids 11 (referred to as 11 Standards 11 
in industry today) is a relatively slow process. There are parts that can 
almost be built faster than they can be evaluated. From a cost/schedule 
standpoint, this puts NDE in a bad light. We need NDT equipment that can be 
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standardized and has the evaluation capability built in. For example, 
ultrasonics is potentially capable of actually measuring and characterizing a 
defect. If the NOT data were recorded by a computer and interfaced with a 
memory bank, containing the characterizations of the defects to be evaluated, 
an automatic comparison and evaluation could be obtained. A more universal 
standard could then be used to periodically calibrate the basic equipment, and 
not used as an inspection aid. This is the kind of NOE equipment that is 
needed, 
To summarize, there are four points I would like to emphasize: 
(1) nondestructive testing detection capability is adequate; (2) you must have 
discipline in the NOT procedures; (3) the NOT processes must be made to be 
faster to become more cost~effective; and (4) please accept the challenge to 
design the NOE capability into the NOT equipment. If money and effort is to 
be spent, this task should get a major share. 
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DISCUSSION 
LIEUTENANT MICHAEL BUCKLEY (Air Force Materials, WPAFB): Ed, if they decide 
to build the wing of the B-1 out of a composite, are you all set to 
inspect it? 
MR. CAUSTIN: Of course, it depends on the design, but I believe this: for 
composites, the detection capability is adequate and is just as good as 
with any other material. A recent workshop, held by the National 
Research Council, on NDE of composites, reported that the NOT capability 
of detection was adequate, The big problem was--what is the critical 
flaw size? 
LIEUTENANT BUCKLEY: Put it this way: Would you fly on it? 
MR. CAUSTIN: Today, I am flying in airplanes I know a lot less about than 
I will with composites. I see FAA reports with sizeable cracks in spars 
and in longerons on the airplanes we are flying in today. Yes, I•d 
fly in it. 
PROFESSOR GORDON KINO (Stanford University): I am kind of interested in the 
fact that you say you have to use standards all the time. Surely a 
hole has a certain size. You are using a particular piece of equipment 
that either is using time or space or something as its own internal 
standard. Is it a matter of not having a gray scale so that the amp-
litude is all over the place, or what makes you have to keep on using 
standards that you are recalibrating? 
MR. CAUSTIN: I think it is more a lack of confidence in the techniques as 
far as the capability of telling the exact defect size. Hence, a 
standard that closely represents the structure is used. Standard~ do 
help to sort out stray observations, or characteristics that the operators 
are not sure of. I expect the computerized techniques, and other methods 
of processing data, will help eliminate many needs for such standards. 
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